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
 indexes the efficiency of secondary market;
another simple measure of financial depth;
captures degree of “liquidity” in economy
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3 types of paper
blue paper  non-circulating private paper 
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cannot be resold on Thursday)
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(can be resold on Thursday: 
“inside money”)
green paper  shells & gold    fiat money
(“outside money”)
/
Moore
King
Branson
3 types of paper
mnemonic
blue paper – ice: illiquid   
red paper – blood: liquid: circulates 
around economy
green paper – dollar bills (“greenbacks”) 
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A Vision of the Future
(two visions)
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discrete time t = 1, 2, 3, …
one homogenous good, corn, storable 
(one for one)
no uncertainty
infinitely lived agents choose consumption
path {ct, ct+1, ct+2, …} to maximise
Σ   βs log ct+s 0<β<1
∞
s = 0
each agent undertakes a sequence of        
projects
every 3 days, an agent starts a project
that completes 2 days later:
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 time
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each agent undertakes a sequence of        
projects
every 3 days, an agent starts a project
that completes 2 days later:
to produce y corn on day t+2 requires  
input G(y) corn on day t:   
where     G(y)   y 1/(1-) 0<<1
in a symmetric allocation, population is 
equally divided into 3 groups:
(normalise aggregate population = 3)
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first-best (Arrow-Debreu):
efficient production:   G(y*)  =  β2
smooth consumption:  ct  [y* – G(y*)] 13
first-best (Arrow-Debreu):
efficient production:   G(y*)  =  β2
smooth consumption:  ct  [y* – G(y*)] 13
BUT, unlike in Arrow-Debreu, we assume
θ <  1  
at start of a project, investing agent can 
credibly promise at most θy of harvest y
01
1 θ
trust
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G(y) = β3            =>       y  below  y*
under-investment
Investment
Storage
extreme case: θ = 0 (autarky; Robinson 
Crusoe)
time
not only is there under-investment, 
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Saving
time
introduce outside money (green paper):        
same steady-state allocations as in autarky
except that no corn need be tied up in 
storage (Samuelson, 1958)
Investment
less extreme: θ > 0
i.e. investing agent can issue private paper
but adverse selection causes the 
secondary market to break down …
assume project comprises a large number 
of parts, some of which are lemons 
assume project comprises a large number 
of parts, some of which are lemons 
no-one can distinguish lemons on day of 
investment, day t
insiders privately learn which parts are 
lemons by day t+1
outsiders remain uninformed until day t+2
assume project comprises a large number 
of parts, some of which are lemons 
no-one can distinguish lemons on day of 
investment, day t
insiders privately learn which parts are 
lemons by day t+1
outsiders remain uninformed until day t+2
but there is a remedy …
at start of project (day t), investing agent 
can bundle parts together so that lemons 
cannot be separated out later (day t+1)
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bundling  financial intermediation/banking
converts illiquid paper (blue paper) 
that cannot be resold at t+1
into liquid paper (red paper)
that can be resold at t+1
cost of bundling a portion z ( y) of output:
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( in first-best, there is 
no bundling, no banking
no inside money, no red paper)
q = issue price of blue paper
(price in terms of day t corn of a 
credible claim to day t+2 corn, that 
cannot be resold on day t+1)
p2 = issue price of red paper
(price in terms of day t corn of a 
credible claim to day t+2 corn, that      
can be resold on day t+1, at price p)
basic inequalities:
1   p2   q   β2
if p  1  then  green paper not used
result!
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when green paper used (p=1),  r  = 1q – 1
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(held twice)
 q = 1: no liquidity premium
 no bundling: no red paper
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1     p2   q     β2
if strict, green paper
does not circulate
positive liquidity premium 
 bundling, red paper
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between projects, agent holds illiquid (blue) 
paper of different vintages
 great weight on paper markets
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era 3 is a nice example of the power of 
Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”: 
to create double-coincidences-of-wants 
in dated goods,   
to wriggle round the inflexibility of 
illiquid paper
era 3 is a nice example of the power of 
Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”: 
to create double-coincidences-of-wants 
in dated goods,   
to wriggle round the inflexibility of 
illiquid paper
indeed, with enough trust (θ close to 1), 
first-best is achieved
(in the limit θ = 1, Arrow-Debreu)
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